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Introduction
From the friends we make to the foods we like, via our
shopping and sleeping habits, most aspects of our quo-
tidian lives can now be turned into machine-readable
data points. For those able to turn these data points into
models predicting what we will do next, this data can be
a source of wealth. For those keen to replace biased,
fickle human decisions, this data—sometimes mislead-
ingly—offers the promise of automated, increased accu-
racy. For those intent on modifying our behaviour, this
data can help build a puppeteer’s strings. As we move
from one way of framing data governance challenges to
another, salient answers change accordingly. Just like
the wealth redistribution way of framing those chal-
lenges tends to be met with a property-based, ‘it’s our
data’ answer, when one frames the problem in terms of
manipulation potential, dignity-based, human rights
answers rightly prevail (via fairness and transparency-
based answers to contestability concerns). Positive data-
sharing aspirations tend to be raised within altogether
different conversations from those aimed at addressing
the above concerns. Our data Trusts proposal challenges
these boundaries.
This article proceeds from an analysis of the very
particular type of vulnerability concomitant with our
‘leaking’ data on a daily basis, to show that data owner-
ship is both unlikely and inadequate as an answer to
the problems at stake. We also argue that the current
construction of top-down regulatory constraints on
contractual freedom is both necessary and insufficient.
To address the particular type of vulnerability at stake,
bottom-up empowerment structures are needed. The
latter aim to ‘give a voice’ to data subjects whose
choices when it comes to data governance are often re-
duced to binary, ill-informed consent. While the rights
Key Points
 The current lack of legal mechanisms that may
plausibly empower us, data subjects to ‘take the
reins’ of our personal data leaves us vulnerable.
Recent regulatory endeavours to curb contractual
freedom acknowledge this vulnerability but can-
not, by themselves, remedy it—nor can data
ownership. The latter is both unlikely and inade-
quate as an answer to the problems at stake.
 We argue that the power that stems from aggre-
gated data should be returned to individuals
through the legal mechanism of Trusts.
 Bound by a fiduciary obligation of undivided loy-
alty, the data trustees would exercise the data
rights conferred by the GDPR (or other top-
down regulation) on behalf of the Trust’s benefi-
ciaries. The data trustees would hence be placed
in a position where they can negotiate data use in
conformity with the Trust’s terms, thus introduc-
ing an independent intermediary between data
subjects and data collectors.
 Unlike the current ‘one size fits all’ approach to
data governance, there should be a plurality of
Trusts, allowing data subjects to choose a Trust
that reflects their aspirations, and to switch
Trusts when needed. Data Trusts may arise out
of publicly or privately funded initiatives.
 By potentially facilitating access to ‘pre-autho-
rized’, aggregated data (consent would be negoti-
ated on a collective basis), our data Trust
proposal may remove key obstacles to the realiza-
tion of the potential underlying large datasets.
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granted by instruments like the GDPR can be used as
tools in a bid to shape possible data-reliant futures—
such as better use of natural resources, medical care,
etc, their exercise is both demanding and unlikely to be
as impactful when leveraged individually. As a bottom-
up governance structure that is uniquely capable of
taking into account the vulnerabilities outlined in the
first section, we highlight the constructive potential in-
herent in data Trusts. This potential crosses the tradi-
tional boundaries between individualist protection
concerns on one hand and collective empowerment
aspirations on the other.
The second section explains how the Trust structure
allows data subjects to choose to pool the rights they
have over their personal data within the legal framework
of a data Trust. It is important that there be a variety of
data Trusts, arising out of a mix of publicly and pri-
vately funded initiatives. Each Trust will encapsulate a
particular set of aspirations, reflected in the terms of the
Trust. Bound by a fiduciary obligation of undivided loy-
alty, data trustees will exercise the data rights held under
the Trust according to its particular terms. In contrast
to a recently commissioned report,1 we explain why
data can indeed be held in a Trust, and why the extent
to which certain kinds of data may be said to give rise to
property rights is neither here nor there as far as our
proposal is concerned. What matters, instead, is the ex-
tent to which regulatory instruments such as the GDPR
confer rights, and for what kind of data. The breadth of
those rights will determine the possible scope of data
Trusts in various jurisdictions.
Our ‘Case Studies’ aim to illustrate the complemen-
tarity of our data Trusts proposal with the legal provi-
sions pertaining to different kinds of personal data,
from medical, genetic, financial, and loyalty card data to
social media feeds. The final section critically considers
a variety of implementation challenges, which range
from Trust Law’s cross-jurisdictional aspects to uptake
and exit procedures, including issues related to data of
shared provenance. We conclude by highlighting the
way in which an ecosystem of data Trusts addresses eth-
ical, legal, and political needs that are complementary to
those within the reach of regulatory interventions such
as the GDPR.
From big mother to big brother and
vice-versa: risk or asset?
The promise of the modern digital society is that our
computers will be able to second guess us, providing for
our every need like some form of digital mother. Such
omniscient provision2 presupposes a degree of surveil-
lance that can quickly flip from well-intentioned benev-
olence to the malign curbing of individual freedoms—a
form of Big Brother—depending on the way you look at
it: just like two sides of the same coin (Big Mother v Big
Brother). The extent to which we are each comfortable
with such digital supervision is inherently subjective,
and therefore surely a matter for personal choice, but
our levers for control are currently limited: at times we
can turn the lever to on or off. At others, the lever seems
out of reach entirely.
Another way of formulating the ‘Big Brother/Big
Mother’ dichotomy relies on the concept of risk: from a
Big Brother perspective, before becoming an asset, per-
sonal data is first and foremost a source of risk. A risk that
is unfamiliar to us, and difficult to assimilate in our deci-
sion making. The unfamiliarity of this risk is not restricted
to the data subjects: as a law-making body that may be
tasked with reforming data governance, the American
Senate’s hearing after the Cambridge Analytica scandal
was almost as newsworthy as the scandal itself, revealing a
very poor understanding of Facebook’s business model.3
Instrumental-risks in this data proliferation have
been understood for a number of years. Arthur Miller’s
‘The Assault on Privacy’ was written in the late 1960s
and outlines many of the risks that data protection leg-
islation attempts to ameliorate. In the intervening years,
a different kind of risk, which is cumulative by nature,
has emerged: the data we leak daily has become some-
thing by reference to which we may be continuously
judged.4 The systematic collection of data allows our
lives to be dissected to an unprecedented degree.
Although any individual fact learned about us may be
1 Chris Reed, BPE solicitors and Pinsent Masons, Data trusts: Legal and
Governance Considerations (2019). <https://theodi.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/04/General-legal-report-on-data-trust.pdf> accessed 10
September 2019.
2 V Mavroudis and M Veale, ‘Eavesdropping whilst you are Shopping:
Balancing Personalisation and Privacy in Connected Retail Spaces’
(2018) 18 IET Conference Proceedings 10.
3 Sara Fischer and Dan Primack, ‘Mark Zuckerberg outwits Congress’
(AXIOS, 2018) <https://www.axios.com/mark-zuckerberg-outwits-con
gress-facebook-42fc1d21-ba2f-4cbb-82a2-93c29bae969c.html> accessed
10 September 2019.
4 Hildebrandt advocates a practice of ‘agonistic machine learning’ to pro-
vide us with the ‘means to achieve effective protection against overdeter-
mination of individuals by machine inferences’: Mireille Hidebrandt,
‘Privacy as Protection of the Incomputable Self: From Agnostic to
Agonistic Machine Learning’ (2019) 20 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 83.
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inconsequential, taken together, over time, a detailed
picture of who we are and what motivates us emerges.5
It is not a new phenomenon for decisions to be taken
about us on the basis of our personal data. Some of
these decisions can be challenged by legal means. Yet,
the amount of time and effort required to mount such
challenges means they are likely to be restricted to deci-
sions of considerable import. While the European situa-
tion6 may not be as bad as elsewhere7 when it comes to
accessibility issues, the active exercise of one’s data pro-
tection rights nevertheless requires a considerable level
of knowledge and agility. Independently of these acces-
sibility concerns, ex-post remedies remain poorly suited
to a world where a vast number of seemingly insignifi-
cant decisions can together end up painting a radically
different picture for our lives.
The cumulative way in which we provide our data, as
well as the cumulative nature of the resulting decision-
making, presents particular challenges to our freedoms.8
Never before has the self we aspire to be been con-
strained to such an extent by our past9: not just in in-
strumental ways, as recognized by the right to be
forgotten, but in a subtly nefarious manner. It is the in-
sidious nature of this risk that is not well addressed10 by
our existing legal mechanisms. How do we control for
this death by a thousand cuts?
Data ownership?
One of the mechanisms through which we have tradition-
ally sought to assert control over our surroundings is
ownership. As an instrument of control, the concept of
ownership has facilitated past aberrations such as the
ability to own other people (slavery) or to restrict the ex-
tent to which people may enjoy the fruits of their labour
(serfdom). Ownership has also been taken as a proxy for
other forms of power, as instantiated in the restriction of
voting rights to land-owners. Today data ownership is
sometimes hailed as a precondition in order to return
‘control’ to the individual (particularly so in the
American literature11). This ongoing, intuitive association
of ownership with control seems to draw on a specific
ideal of property, which is reflected in the saying, ‘one’s
home is one’s castle’: ‘in the usual course of events, access
to a person’s home requires a consensual transaction with
the owner, and unconsented uses can be enjoined’.12
Yet, as Evans points out, ‘different assets call for dif-
ferent forms of ownership’ (or more accurately, differ-
ent types of property rights). Personal data is rather
unlike homes (or castles). The type of property rights
data can give rise to13 are more akin to the ‘nonexclu-
sive rights riparian owners have in a river that runs by
their land’.14 Not only can public good considerations
justify substantial restrictions on the use of that stretch
of river (just like they can for data15). The necessary
inter-dependence between those located upstream and
downstream entails the need to take into account
others’ right to non-interference. This riparian meta-
phor is helpful when considering a variety of regimes
governing conflicting data rights, such as that pertaining
to medical data used for research purposes (navigation
rights trumping irrigation rights could be compared to
researchers’ right to decline an erasure request).
Ownership is not only unlikely to provide the level
of control16 wished for: it is also a poor answer to the
5 Mireille Hildebrandt, ‘Defining Profiling: A New Type of Knowledge?’ in
Mireille Hildebrandt and Serge Gutwirth (eds), Profiling the European
Citizen: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives (Springer, Netherlands 2008).
6 In Europe, individuals can lodge data protection complaints with their
national supervisory authority—the ICO in the UK. The GDPR’s making
it possible for Member States to implement collective redress mecha-
nisms (art 80) also has the potential to improve accessibility issues.
7 Under the CCPA in the USA, class actions would currently be limited to
data breaches only (though there are calls for the private right of action
to be broadened beyond such data breaches): the California Consumer
Privacy Act 2018 (if it comes into force without amendments in January
2020) would mean that the need for the plaintiff to establish that she has
suffered actual harm following a data breach would be bypassed, allowing
for the filing of class actions to obtain statutory damages following a data
breach.
8 Julie Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self (Yale University Press, New
Haven and London 2012).
9 S Delacroix and M Veale, ‘Smart Technologies and Our Sense of Self:
The Limitations of Counter-Profiling’ in Mireille Hildebrandt and
Kieron O’Hara (eds), Life and the Law in the Era of Data-Driven Agency
(Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2020).
10 Wachter and Mittelstadt emphasize that ‘compared to other types of per-
sonal data, inferences are effectively ‘economy class’ personal data in the
GDPR’: S Wachter and B Mittelstadt, ‘A right to reasonable inferences:
re-thinking data protection law in the age of Big Data and AI’ (2019) 2
Columbia Business Law Review 494.
11 See also JB Rule and L Hunter, ‘Towards Property Rights in Personal
Data’ in CJ Bennett and R Grant (eds), Visions of Privacy: Policy Choices
for the Digital Age (University of Toronto 1999) and JB Rule, Privacy in
Peril (OUP 2007) 196. For a European voice arguing along the same
lines, see N Purtova, Property Rights in Personal Data: A European
Perspective (Kluwer Law International 2012).
12 Barbara J Evans, ‘Much Ado About Data Ownership’ (2011) 25 Harvard
Journal of Law and Technology 69.
13 This will be expanded upon in section ‘The possibility (and advantages)
of holding data rights under a legal Trust’.
14 Evans.
15 ‘Individual control and property rights over personal data are both on
the same spectrum of potential regulatory responses to the personal data
processing phenomenon [. . .] If control is absolute, it will diminish the
public domain and have a negative impact on other rights and interests.
Moreover, the realities of the bargaining process and of the technological
environment cannot be ignored. This is something which must be borne
in mind by those advocating strong rights of control or rights of owner-
ship on behalf of individual data subjects, and when brining to the mar-
ket personal data lockers and vaults’: Orla Lynskey, The Foundations of
EU Data Protection Law (OUP 2018) 252.
16 Along this line, Lazaro and Le Metayer emphasise that ‘[t]he premise of
autonomy and active agency implied in this rhetoric [of control] seems
to be radically undermined in the context of contemporary digital envi-
ronments and practices’; Christophe Lazaro and Daniel Le Metayer,
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type of problems (and vulnerabilities) at stake.17 While
some of the early voices that were instrumental to the
emergence of data privacy law advocated extensive reli-
ance on property law,18 today the ‘law and doctrine on
human rights’ are ‘generally regarded as providing the
principal normative basis’19 for data privacy law. This
turn to human rights reflects the fundamental nature
of the harms that can ensue from the abusive exploita-
tion of personal data. Not only are such harms ill-
addressed20 through material compensation; they are
also difficult, if not impossible, to prevent through in-
dividual vigilance alone. Unlike most homes (or river)
owners, very few of us have the time or know-how to
understand—let alone control—what parts of our data
we are happy to share, and under what terms. The sys-
tematic monitoring of one’s data presupposes resour-
ces that most simply do not have.
Regulatory interventions such as the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR),21 which divides us pri-
marily into data subjects and data controllers, seek to
address these epistemic imbalances. The term data sub-
ject has unfortunate, but perhaps appropriate, connota-
tions of royalty and feudal society, where an individual
is subject to whims beyond their control: there is a
power-asymmetry between the subjects and the control-
lers.22 This asymmetry arises because the controllers
have accumulated data from many individuals, which
allows them to invest time and expertise into the proc-
essing. In contrast, the subject has knowingly or un-
knowingly provided her data to many entities—
including mostly ‘invisible’ data brokers23—and has
neither the expertise nor the time to unpick each data
controller’s motivations and methods.
The downsides of a contractual approach to
data governance
The duties imposed by the GDPR on data controllers
stem in part from an acknowledgement that individual
data subjects are rarely in a position to bargain. Aside
from the need to address gross power imbalances, those
curbs on contractual freedom also proceed from an
awareness of the fact that a strictly contractual ap-
proach24 to data governance is likely to compromise aspi-
rations that underlie the very raison-d’eˆtre of liberal
democracies.
Among these aspirations is a commitment to the re-
jection of social cruelty.25 Our digital society generates
novel forms of vulnerabilities: today it is near impossible
to go about one’s life without leaving a data trail that, po-
tentially, reveals more about ourselves to strangers than
we’d ever disclose to friends. This makes us vulnerable.
This vulnerability can be exploited in a way that compro-
mises our ability to retain some minimal sense of ‘au-
thorship’ over our lives: our ability to maintain a social
self that is at least partly set out by us is compromised,
just as the vulnerability of the elderly, the ill, or the prose-
cuted can be overlooked with similar effects. Their insti-
tutionally exposed age or weakness can be ignored—or
taken advantage of—resulting in the compromission of
‘their capacity to develop and maintain an integral sense
of self’.26 The loss of opacity that is concomitant with the
potentially detailed, personal knowledge garnered by data
controllers is at least as conducive to similar forms of so-
cial cruelty, albeit in less visible, more subtle ways.
It is because healthcare providers, lawyers, and edu-
cators are in a position to greatly exacerbate—or mod-
erate—the above vulnerability that high standards of
‘Control over personal data: true remedy or fairy tale?’ (2015) 12
SCRIPTed 3, 29.
17 Kan and Buchner also highlight the extent to which the adoption of a
‘property rights’ terminology to conceptualize our personal data can
have insidious effects, potentially leading us to treat our personal data
more ‘like [our] car than [our] soul’ Jerry Kan and Benedikt Buchner,
‘Privacy in Altantis’ (2004) 18 Harvard Journal of Law and Technology
229, 260.
18 AF Westin, Privacy and Freedom (Atheneum 1967).
19 LA Bygrave, Data Privacy Law (OUP 2014).
20 The explicit inclusion of ‘non-material’ damages within the scope of eli-
gible damages in art 82 GDPR has been welcomed as providing much
needed clarity.
21 EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): Regulation (EU) 2016/
679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of per-
sonal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ 2016 L
119/1. Due to space constraints, we have not addressed in any detail the
way in which our proposed data trusts would complement other regula-
tory interventions, such as the California Consumer Privacy Act 2018
(CCPA): building upon distinct frameworks of data protection developed
since the 1970s, the CCPA endows ‘consumers’ with rights against ‘busi-
nesses’ holding their ‘personal data’ (which is broadly defined).
22 Recital 43 refers to the ‘imbalance’ between data controller and
data subject. See also Paul De Hert and Serge Gutwirth, ‘Privacy, data
protection and law enforcement. Opacity of the individual and transpar-
ency of power’ in E Claes, A Duff and Serge Gutwirth (eds), Privacy and
the Criminal Law (Intersentia 2006).
23 Data brokers are not directly susceptible to consumer pressure in the
manner of consumer-facing data controllers. Sociologists have criticised
the lack of regulation in the industry: Leanne Roderick, ‘Discipline and
Power in the Digital Age: The Case of the US Consumer Data Broker
Industry’ (2014) 40 Critical Sociology 729.
24 Volokh has argued that we can protect privacy by private ordering
through contract: Eugene Volokh, ‘Freedom of Speech and Information
Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from
Speaking About You’ (2000) 52 Stanford Law Review 1049.
25 Sangiovanni defines social cruelty as involving ‘the unauthorized, harm-
ful, and wrongful use of another’s vulnerability to attack or obliterate
their capacity to develop and maintain an integral sense of self’: Andrea
Sangiovanni, Humanity without Dignity: Moral Equality, Respect and
Human Rights (Harvard UP 2017). Note that the term ‘use’ is to be un-
derstood loosely: Sangiovanni for instance refers to instances of institu-
tional neglect (such as in residential care homes).
26 Ibid.
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professional responsibility are expected of them. What
about those in charge of deciding what parts of our per-
sonal data can be collected and processed, and for what
purpose? They too are in a position to greatly exacerbate
the particular vulnerability27 that flows from the
disclosure of granular information about our machine-
readable past (and present). Yet, unlike healthcare pro-
viders, lawyers, or educators, this position of power is
not concomitant with any personal relationship, making
it all the easier for data controllers to insulate them-
selves from the responsibility underlying their position.
Data protection law foresees many situations in which
an organization will hold data about an individual with-
out any direct contact having ever been made.28
Summary so far
We have characterized some of the challenges associated
with the cumulative and insidious way in which we pro-
vide our data:
1. Recent regulatory endeavours to curb contractual
freedom cannot by themselves reverse the power-
asymmetry between data controllers/businesses and
data subjects/consumers.
2. The current lack of legal mechanisms that may plausibly
(and collectively) empower data subjects threatens one
of the key commitments underlying our liberal democ-
racies. The vulnerability that stems from the institu-
tional exposure of our machine-readable past can be
overlooked or exploited in a way that compromises our
ability to maintain a social self that is at least partly con-
trolled by us. Unlike the instrumental risks attached to
punctual decisions (such as a mortgage applications),
the risks concomitant with this vulnerability are cumu-
lative: seemingly inconsequential decisions have down-
stream effects outside our control.
3. The above risks are also difficult to grasp and
inherently subjective. The current, ‘one size fits all’
approach does not allow different individuals to
choose among different approaches to data gover-
nance, which reflect both their subjective attitude to
risk and their moral and political aspirations.
In the next section, we consider how we can address
these challenges through the mechanism of data Trusts.
The Trust structure as a way of taking
into account the vulnerabilities at stake
We propose data Trusts as a bottom-up mechanism,
whereby data subjects choose to pool the rights they
have over their personal data within the legal framework
of the Trust. In our proposal, the data subjects tend to
be both the settlors and the beneficiaries of the Trust: the
trustees are compelled to manage the subjects’ data
according to the terms of the Trust. They have a fidu-
ciary responsibility towards the data subjects (the bene-
ficiaries of the Trust). We envision an ecosystem of
Trusts arising out of a mix of publicly and privately
funded initiatives,29 each with different constitutional
terms, allowing data subjects to choose among different
approaches to data governance. A successful Trust
would be in control of more data and be able to deliver
more benefit to data subjects.
To the best of our knowledge, the idea of ‘bottom-
up’ data Trusts was first publicly suggested in 2016.30
The legal mechanism of a data Trust31 aims to leverage
the resources concomitant with the pooling of data to
directly address the power-asymmetries mentioned
above. A Trust is formed when a person in whom a set
of resources is vested—the Trustee—is compelled to
hold and manage those resources either for the benefit
of another person(s)—the beneficiaries—or for some le-
gally enforceable purpose(s) other than the Trustee’s
own. Aside from its allowing for ‘more subtle shades of
ownership than the common law permits’,32 the duties
which a Trust structure imposes upon the Trustee(s)
are also better suited to the particular vulnerabilities at
stake, as they demand the Trustee’s undivided loyalty
and dedication to the interests and aspirations of the
data subjects (as beneficiaries of the Trust).
The Trustee’s duties are fiduciary. A fiduciary duty is
considerably more onerous than a ‘duty of care’. Under
Tort law, a defendant may be found in breach of that
duty if the defendant is shown to not have taken
27 Coeckelbergh examines the extent to which ICT transforms the way in
which we cope with ‘existential vulnerabilities’. This Heideggerian
understanding of vulnerability differs from the notion of vulnerability ex-
plored here: Mark Coeckelbergh, ‘The Art of Living with ICTs: The
Ethics–Aesthetics of Vulnerability Coping and Its Implications for
Understanding and Evaluating ICT Cultures’ (2017) 22 Foundations of
Science 339.
28 Art 14(5)(b) of the GDPR allows for controllers to never contact an indi-
vidual when they indirectly receive data relating to them insofar as it
involves ‘disproportionate effort’.
29 Implementation challenges, including the successful ‘seeding’ of an eco-
system of data Trusts, are discussed in section ‘Implementation
challenges’.
30 Neil Lawrence, ‘Data trusts could allay our privacy fears’, The Guardian
Media & Tech Network <https://www.theguardian.com/media-network/
2016/jun/03/data-trusts-privacy-fears-feudalism-democracy> accessed 10
September 2019.
31 In ‘Implementation challenges’, we explain why the legal mechanism of a
data Trust can be relied on, in part addressing some of the questions
raised in Kieron O’Hara, ‘Data Trusts: Ethics, Architecture and
Governance for Trustworthy Data Stewardship’ (2019 Web Science
Institute White Papers).
32 Scott Atkins, Equity and Trusts (OUP 2018).
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‘reasonable care’ to avert some ‘reasonably foreseeable’
harm. Reasonable care is defined as the level of concern
that a ‘reasonable person’33 would apply. Our contention
is that, where personal data is concerned, ‘reasonable
care’ is not sufficient: the ‘ethical relationship of trust’34
underlying fiduciary duties is better suited to the vulner-
abilities at stake, especially given the Court’s jurisdiction
to supervise and, if necessary, to intervene on behalf of
the beneficiaries to enforce the Trust against a trustee.
The fact that the burden of proof is reversed is also im-
portant. In the event of a claim, it is for the trustees to
demonstrate that they have sought to promote the bene-
ficiaries’ interest with appropriate degrees of impartiality,
prudence, transparency and undivided loyalty.35 This
loyalty condition is important: while trustees can be re-
munerated for their services, trustees cannot profit from
a Trust, and more generally cannot allow their own inter-
ests to conflict with those of the beneficiaries. This condi-
tion calls into question those proposals that seek to
impose fiduciary duties upon data collectors/controllers.
Among those proposals, Edwards was the first to see
the potential inherent in Trusts as a legal mechanism for
managing a resource—personal data—that is accumu-
lated by small contributions.36 Under her proposal, an
‘implied’37 data Trust is created whenever data subjects
share personal data with data collectors. The latter are
deemed to be the trustees. This is problematic, given the
undivided loyalty38 condition. In contrast, our proposal
presupposes the creation of ‘express’ Trusts, and it
requires the appointment of independent trustees who
are bound by the Trust’s purposes and terms. The latter
can vary from one Trust to another. Importantly, this
allows for an ecosystem of Trusts, where a variety of data
sharing policies across Trusts gives data subjects a range
of choices that reflect their personal trade-offs: the result-
ing diversity also allows society to explore different princi-
ples for data sharing within the same digital ecosystem.
Information fiduciaries
Balkin suggests that economic and tax incentives39
ought to be offered to data controllers in exchange for
their accepting ‘fiduciary obligations’, provided these
obligations are ‘not too broad’. Why not too broad?
Because ‘it might follow that online service providers
could not make any money at all from this data because
the data might be used in some way to some end-user’s
disadvantage’.40
This proposal does not tackle the power asymmetries
inherent in our current system of data feudalism. Balkin
is right to point out that ‘fiduciary’ does not mean ‘not
for profit’: in many jurisdictions41 healthcare providers
and lawyers are deemed to have fiduciary obligations to-
wards their patients or clients. This does not mean that
they cannot be paid for their work. What it does mean
is that they have an obligation of undivided loyalty to-
wards their patient/client: a doctor who is set to profit
from her patients’ drug prescriptions (because of her
holding pharma shares, say) would be found in breach
of her fiduciary duties.42
If a data controller has a business interest in the data
provided by data subjects, this results in a conflict be-
tween that interest and her duty towards data subjects.
Data controllers in this position would be obliged to
both maximize the value of the personal data they col-
lect (for the benefit of shareholders) and concomitantly
honour fiduciary obligations towards data subjects.
While Balkin does acknowledge the potential for con-
flict of interest,43 he fails to draw the only logical con-
clusion: a fiduciary obligation towards data subjects is
incompatible with the data controllers’ responsibility
towards shareholders. As discussed above, to honour a
fiduciary obligation not only demands independence
from profit maximization: it also requires an ability to
relate to the complex and multi-faceted nature of the
33 John Gardner, ‘The many Faces of the Reasonable Person’ (2015) 131
Law Quarterly Review 563.
34 Hartley Goldstone, ‘The Moral Core of Trusteeship’ (2013) 152 Trusts &
Estates 5.
35 The delineation of a Trustee’s duties and responsibilities is open to inter-
pretation. It varies to some extent from one jurisdiction to another, but
also in accordance with the terms and purpose of the Trust. Most impor-
tantly, implementation choices (discussed in section ‘Challenges and op-
portunities inherent in holding data rights under a Trust (rather than a
contractual agreement or corporate structure’) will determine whether
the trustee must be deemed a data controller under the GDPR or not.
36 L Edwards, ‘The Problem with privacy’ (2004) 18 International Review of
Law Computers & Technology.
37 Given Edwards’ referring to the ‘administrative headache’ that would
stem from the fact that ‘millions of data subjects would have a claim on
millions of different aggregate data ‘trusts’, with one trust for each data
collector’, it is unlikely that such Trusts would be express Trusts. See
ibid.
38 There is a degree of confusion about the exact nature of the ‘trustee’s’
duties under Edwards’ scheme: under Equity law, the latter cannot but be
fiduciary, with the stringent obligations discussed above. It may be that
the ambiguity stems in part from the fact the Trust structure is referred
to by Edwards as a way of justifying a ‘privacy tax’, which in practice
does not require any reliance on Equity (in effect, the Trust structure
mostly serves a justificatory purpose).
39 Jack M Balkin, ‘Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment’
(2016) 49 UC Davis Law Review 1183. Zittrain also suggests immunity
from certain kinds of lawsuits among the incentives that could be offered:
Jonathan Zittrain, ‘Engineering an Election’ (2013) 127 Harvard Law
Review Forum 335, 339.
40 Balkin (n 39) 1227.
41 Canada is the only country to explicitly characterize the patient–doctor
relationship as fiduciary. In the US fiduciary duties are recognized as an
independent ground for action in respect to particular obligations (such
as confidentiality) in some states.
42 Moore v Regents of the Univ of Cal, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal 1990).
43 Balkin (n 39) 1126.
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vulnerability inherent in the data subject/data controller
relationship. In this respect, the ‘information fiduciary’
proposed by Balkin would be placed in a position that is
comparable to that of a doctor44 who gains a commis-
sion on particular drug prescriptions or a lawyer who
uses a company to provide medical reports for his cli-
ents while owning shares in that company.45
Aside from sidestepping the conflict of interest issue
mentioned above, Balkin’s information fiduciary pro-
posal only affords protection to those who are already
in a contractual relationship with ‘digital companies’.
Balkin acknowledges this issue in his more recent paper,
noting that: ‘there are a wide range of situations in
which people lack a contractual relationship with a digi-
tal enterprise or with a business that collects personal
information and uses algorithms to make decisions.’46
To address this issue, Balkin puts forward the Common
Law concepts of public and private nuisance: in Balkin’s
argument, the nuisance that can legitimately be targeted
by regulation (despite First Amendment constraints)
consists in ‘[u]sing algorithms repeatedly and perva-
sively over large populations of people [which] may
inappropriately treat people as risky or otherwise unde-
sirable, impose unjustified burdens and hardships on
populations, and reinforce existing inequalities’.47 If
such is the nature of the ‘nuisance’ at stake, the remedy
proposed by Balkin is puzzling:
The appropriate remedy is to make companies internalize
the costs they shift onto others and onto society as a whole
as they employ algorithmic decision making.48
Balkin does not dwell on the process that would some-
how enable the quantification (and hence ‘internaliza-
tion’) of the ‘cost’ of treating people as ‘otherwise
undesirable’. The type of inequality that is fostered by
the current, ‘feudal’ approach to data governance is not
merely one of material resources or opportunities. As
discussed above, the compromising of our ability to
maintain a social self that is at least partly controlled by
us undermines our commitment to moral equality: our
equal moral worth independently of any contingent
traits (such as the amount of personal data shared
online). Taxes or economic incentives can sometimes
prove effective when tackling socio-economic
inequalities. They are a dubious answer when faced with
structures that foster what may aptly be described as a
form of social cruelty.
Instead of seeking to compensate for the nefarious
effects of the existing data governance framework, our
proposal is to challenge it from the ground-up. As a
bottom-up structure, the data Trust framework is in a
position to plausibly empower data subjects, to ‘take the
reins’ of their data. This contrasts with the current focus
on compensation for the undesirable risks or side-
effects that stem from the current exploitation of our
data by centralized platforms.
When ‘Trust’ is used as a marketing tool
The term ‘data trust’ has also been used recently to refer
to the need for some ‘repeatable framework of terms and
mechanisms’, ‘to facilitate the sharing of data between
organizations holding data and organizations looking to
use data to develop AI’.49 Such frameworks have an im-
portant role to play in facilitating the responsible sharing
of data, which may otherwise remain out of the reach of
organizations that do not have the requisite type of
know-how (and legal support) to be able to leverage
such data without fear of breaching ethical and legal
requirements. But it is unclear what, if anything, such
frameworks have in common with legal Trust structures.
In contrast to the above proposals, the ‘data Trusts’
we have in mind are ‘true’ Trusts, legally speaking.50
The collective setting of terms by the Trust is a way for
data subjects to pool their rights to acquire a ‘voice’:
some Trusts may indeed be run in a way that resembles
a collective or cooperative. There are many historical
precedents for the formation of such bodies to empower
the disenfranchised. For example, ‘Land Societies’51
were formed almost two centuries ago for the purpose
of giving a political voice to their members, who would
not otherwise have had the resources to acquire the
freehold land conditioning their right to vote.
The terms of the Trust may specify a governance struc-
ture that compels the data Trustees to continuously con-
sult and deliberate with the settlors and beneficiaries: in
that case the Trust model would effectively function in
ways similar to a cooperative, albeit with robust fiduciary
44 Balkin’s proposal has the merit of acknowledging some of the similarities
between the vulnerability that characterises the doctor/patient (or law-
yer/client) relationship and that which underlies the data subject/data
controller relationship, even if Balkin only focuses on the epistemic as-
pect of data subjects’ vulnerability: ibid.
45 Solicitors Regulation Authority v Dennison [2012] EWCA Civ 421.
46 Jack M Balkin, ‘Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private
Governance, and New School Speech Regulation Essays’ (2017) 51 UC
Davis Law Review 1149.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Wendy Hall and Je´roˆme Pesenti, Growing the Artificial Intelligence
Industry in the UK (2017).
50 For detailed arguments as to why data Trusts can be ‘true’ Trusts, see sec-
tion ‘The possibility (and advantages) of holding data rights under a legal
Trust’.
51 Thomas Beggs, ‘Freehold Land Societies’ [[Royal Statistical Society,
Wiley]] 16 Journal of the Statistical Society of London 338.
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duties vested in the Trustees. Some data Trusts may pre-
fer a less participatory model, while others may choose to
automatically align themselves to a set of default data
governance principles set by some governmental body.
This ‘bottom-up’ data Trust model is resolutely
complementary to top-down, regulatory constraints (in-
cluding those of the GDPR). Indeed, some of those top-
down constraints will be needed in relation to public good
issues: one may for instance consider an across-Trusts con-
straint which demands that some kind of health-data be
shared in all cases. The choices and aspirations encapsu-
lated in each data Trust will necessarily be limited by top-
down, public interest interventions which must delineate
the scope of legitimate discretionary choice. In this respect,
data trustees are likely to play an important role in shaping
societal debate about ‘whether one can require an individ-
ual [or group of individuals] to contribute to a “greater”
good’.52 We firmly believe in a positive answer to the latter
question, which needs to be the focus of greater public
awareness and debate than is currently the case.
Data trustees will also have to make sure that any
data—with its relevant rights—entrusted by settlors is in
fact genuinely theirs to give (and not merely ‘captured’ by
a data collecting artefact deployed by the purported set-
tlors, for instance). The latter responsibility could be for-
malized as part and parcel of a larger set of ‘professional’
duties (in which case data trustees would be overseen by a
specific professional body), or alternatively as a duty that
has to be complied with for the purpose of certification.
The need to be able to ‘shop around’ data
Trusts
While we are unlikely to have a data Trust tailored spe-
cifically to each individual in society it seems important
that there be a wide variety of data Trusts, each instanti-
ating one particular way of balancing data risks and re-
sponsibilities. Some Trusts may heavily favour the
furthering of some ‘public good’ endeavour by making
some data freely accessible to some organizations, while
others may prioritize the maximization of financial
returns. Others may put great emphasis on minimizing
individual risks. Individuals will be able to shop around,
switching from one Trust to another as and when their
preferences or aspirations evolve. The fostering of such
competition between a wide variety of data Trusts will
not only serve to raise awareness of the fact that there are
many ways of apprehending data risks and responsibili-
ties. It will also make it more likely that our data gover-
nance structures remain in touch with the evolving needs
and aspirations of multi-faceted societies.
Two conditions must be met for such an ecosystem to
thrive: the barrier for entry must be low—the creation
of new Trusts must be relatively straightforward—(condi-
tion 1) and the data subjects’ data must be secure
(condition 2). Given that the expertise for building secure
data infrastructure is in short supply, many Trusts may
prefer to focus on collectively setting the terms according
to which the settlors’ data may be used, relying on com-
putational and storage infrastructure from commercial
suppliers. It might even be the case that data subjects re-
tain physical control of their data, such as in a personal
data container, but give Trustees the ability to exercise
their rights and undertake operations over it.
The above also implies a system of data exchange be-
tween Trusts and consumers of the data (companies,
hospitals, etc). Such a data exchange system requires
two fundamental characteristics.
1. An individual’s personal data must be portable be-
tween different computer systems (data portability—
condition 3)
2. An individual’s data must be erasable from any par-
ticular system (data erasure—condition 4)
The successful development of an ecosystem of Trusts is
contingent on their ability to make use of the currently lim-
ited rights around data portability and data erasure: for any
Trust to have power it must be able to make its settlors’
data available (under its constitutional terms), but it must
also be able to withdraw data from a particular controller if
it is to specify disapproval of a particular form of data use.
At the moment, this need to be able to demand data
erasure is only partially backed by legal provisions. In
Europe, Article 17 of the GDPR grants a right to have
personal data erased in certain circumstances only.
Among the several limitations, the ‘overriding legiti-
mate interest to continue processing’53 constitutes a sig-
nificant exception.54
52 Hielke Hijmans and Charles Raab, ‘Ethical dimensions of the GDPR’, 20
August 2018, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3222677, forthcoming in Mark Cole and Franziska Boehm (eds),
Commentary on the General Data Protection Regulation (Edward Elgar).
53 When ‘legitimate interest’ is relied on as the basis of processing.
54 Similar exceptions apply to the right to deletion under the CCPA, which
also includes an exemption from deletion requests if such requests inter-
fere with a right to ‘exercise free speech, ensure the right of another con-
sumer to exercise his or her right of free speech, or exercise another right
provided by law’ Peter Stockburger, ‘The Good, Bad, And The Ugly: Key
Takeaways From California’s New Privacy Law’ (Mondaq, 13 November
2018) <http://www.mondaq.com/canada/x/754510/TheþGoodþBadþ
AndþTheþUglyþKeyþTakeawaysþFromþCaliforniasþNewþPrivacyþ
Law> accessed 10 September 2019. For a discussion of the trade-off be-
tween confidentiality requirements and the data controller’s ability to en-
act the data subjects’ rights to erase (or access) their data, see Michael
Veale, Reuben Binns and Jef Ausloos, ‘When Data Protection by Design
and Data Subject Rights Clash’ (2018) 8 International Data Privacy Law
105.
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If the erasure requirement is a form of negative con-
trol, the portability requirement allows for positive rein-
forcement: data can be shared with actors that conform
to the policies of the Trust. Under Article 20 of the
GDPR, this portability right is limited to information
that has been ‘provided’ to a controller, actively or pas-
sively, and processed on the basis of consent (or perfor-
mance of a contract).55 In contrast, the right of access
(Article 15 of the GDPR) is stronger and covers all data,
but this data can be provided in any format (unlike
Article 2056), which might hinder automatic transfer or
parsing.57 Interestingly, article 16(4) of the very recent
directive ‘on certain aspects concerning contracts for
the supply of digital content and digital services’ broad-
ens the scope of portability rights to non-personal data,
as consumers are given the right to retrieve ‘any content
other than personal data, which was provided or created
by the consumer when using the digital content or
digital service supplied by the trader’.58
Now, the impact of those—currently limited—porta-
bility and access rights will in part depend upon
shortening the timeframe within which they have to be
acted upon. Article 15 GDPR specifies that a subject
access request should be fulfilled within a month. For
efficient data exchange we might expect Trusts to
require access within milliseconds: performed program-
matically,59 such access requests would be executed by
direct computer interface, without human involvement.
Similar stipulations apply to data erasure.
The impact of those rights will also depend on qual-
ity control and compliance mechanisms: a recent study
analysing the replies to a number of access requests
highlights reports of a large variation in the quality of
the responses received.60 They point out that ‘a substan-
tial proportion of the queried organizations, whether
out of inability or out of unwillingness, are non-
compliant with the law’.61 Sometimes it takes a
‘follow-up request to receive an answer with data that
was previously withheld’, and ‘while many replies are
quite elaborate, even these replies frequently provide in-
adequate information to the individual for making an
informed judgment about the lawfulness of the process-
ing’.62 Most importantly, despite the fact that a right to
access has been in place for over fifteen years, some large
organizations processing personal data reported that
they had never received an access request. As a way for-
ward, this study argues that ‘collective use of the right
of access can help shift the power imbalance between in-
dividual citizens and organizations in favour of the citi-
zen’.63 Along a similar line, Veale and others discuss
both the desirability and challenges inherent in the de-
velopment of some automated platform ‘to enable data
subjects to utilize their rights’.64
As a concrete way of addressing the above concerns,
our data Trust proposal hinges upon the possibility of
assigning those seldom-used rights to a data trustee, who
would exercise them on behalf of the Trust’s beneficiaries
(and settlors). This assignability question is discussed
below.
The possibility (and advantages) of holding
data rights under a legal Trust
A legal framework report entitled ‘Data Trusts: legal
and governance considerations’65 was recently
55 The limits inherent in the right to portability are further discussed in
Helena Ursic, ‘Unfolding the New-Born Right to Data Portability: Four
Gateways to Data Subject Control’ (2018) 15 SCRIPted 42.
56 Art 20 GDPR requires data to be available in a commonly used, struc-
tured, and machine-readable format.
57 It is interesting to note that the scope of the CCPA’s portability obliga-
tions are arguably broader: if the information provided in response to an
access request is delivered electronically (rather than by mail), it must be
‘in a portable and, to the extent technically feasible, in a readily usable
format that allows the consumer to transmit this information to another
entity without hindrance’.
58 Art 16(4) of DIRECTIVE (EU) 2019/770 OF THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 20 May 2019 ‘on certain
aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital content and digital
services’ reads: ‘Except in the situations referred to in point (a), (b) or
(c) of paragraph 3, the trader shall, at the request of the consumer, make
available to the consumer any content other than personal data, which
was provided or created by the consumer when using the digital content
or digital service supplied by the trader. The consumer shall be entitled
to retrieve that digital content free of charge, without hindrance from the
trader, within a reasonable time and in a commonly used and machine-
readable format.’
59 At the moment Recital 59 of the GDPR recommends that organisations
‘provide means for requests to be made electronically, especially where
personal data are processed by electronic means’. Interestingly, for our
purposes, Recital 63 advises that, where possible, organisations should be
able to provide remote access to a secure self-service system which would
provide the individual—or in our case the Data Trustee on behalf of the
data subject—with direct access to his or her information.
60 Interestingly, this study highlights that ‘in most cases a request for infor-
mation about specific data in an initial data request is ignored, while fol-
low-up requests get an individualized reply more often. Sometimes a
follow-up request does receive an answer with data that was previously
withheld’. RLP Mahieu, H Asghari and M van Eeten, ‘Collectively
Exercising the Right of Access: Individual Effort, Societal Effect’ (2018) 7
Internet Policy Review. doi: 10.14763/2018.3.927.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Roger Brownsword, ‘Knowing Me, Knowing you - Profiling, Privacy and
the Public Interest’ in Mireille Hildebrandt and Serge Gutwirth (eds),
Profiling the European Citizen: Cross-disciplinary perspectives (Springer
2008).
64 M. Veale and others, ‘Automating data rights’ in D Eyers and others
(eds), Towards accountable systems (Dagstuhl Reports, Schloss Dagstuhl
2018).
65 Reed, BPE Solicitors, and Pinsent Masons, ‘Data Trusts: legal and gover-
nance considerations’, April 2019, https://theodi.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/04/General-legal-report-on-data-trust.pdf.
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commissioned by the Open Data Institute (ODI). This
report claims that:
data is not capable of constituting property in the legal trust
sense, and thus cannot form the basis of a legal trust in any
of the legal systems which have a concept of trust law.66
In what follows we will outline why this assertion
betrays a misunderstanding of the nature of equitable
property. To do so, we survey the current debate about
the extent to which some kinds of data may plausibly be
said to give rise to property rights. The latter debate is
considered for interest’s sake, as our data trusts pro-
posal does not hinge on this property rights debate. We
subsequently outline the advantages of relying on Trust
law as a legal framework (in contrast to the contractual
or corporate frameworks proposed in the above-
mentioned report), as well as its challenges (rights as-
signability prime among them).
Data rights as the subject matter of the Trust
There are several ways of explaining what led the
authors of the above report to state that ‘data is not
capable of constituting property in the legal trust
sense’. The authors of that report could have been
referring to the fact that data is an intangible asset.67
Some jurisdictions’ understanding of property
(Germany most notable among them) does not
allow the latter to include ‘non-tangible objects’. The
intangible nature of data is however unlikely to
have been the driving concern behind the report’s
conclusion, since in the UK property rights can be
established on any type of tradeable assets68 (tangible
or intangible69), and bank accounts are commonly
held in Trusts. In the latter case, the trustee holds a
personal right to payment (‘right in personam’)
against a bank,70 in trust for the beneficiary.
Alternatively, the authors of the report may have
been referring to the fact that data differs from assets
like bank balances in several respects, key among which
is its non-rival nature: data can easily be duplicated, and
this makes it difficult to exclude others from using that
data.71 In that respect, the challenge is no different from
that pertaining to intellectual property rights—which
are ‘not dependent on any idea of there being
“property” in the creative idea or endeavour’72—and
are also commonly held under Trusts.
Most plausibly, the authors of the report may have
sided with those who take the view that data cannot be
said to give rise to property rights.73 This view is op-
posed by those who argue that the GDPR rights to por-
tability, erasure and access—when applicable—provide
all that is needed to give rise to property rights for these
categories of data. While the latter view is outlined in
the next section, what follows aims to explain why the
extent to which certain kinds of data may be said to give
rise to property rights is neither here nor there as far as
66 Ibid.
67 As such it cannot give rise to a ‘right in rem’.
68 Along this line, Sarah Worthington explains:English law, unlike its civil-
ian counterparts, no longer holds to a sharp divide between tangible
assets (such as land, bicycles and Picasso paintings) and intangible assets
(such as shares, bonds and debts). Put in legal terms, English law no lon-
ger draws hard lines between ‘property’ and ‘obligation’ or ‘property’
and ‘contract’. All these different types of rights are ‘assets’: The British
Academy, The Royal Society and TechUK, Data ownership, rights and
controls: Reaching a common understanding (Discussions at a British
Academy, Royal Society and techUK seminar on 3 October 2018).
69 Today all sorts of intangible assets—or more precisely, the rights such
assets give rise to—can be held under a Trust. Shares ‘might be evidenced
by a document, such as a company share certificate, but the value of the
share is in the rights it gives you against the company’: James Penner,
The Law of Trusts (OUP 2016).
70 ‘The chief characteristic of a property right in relation to a thing is that it
allows B to exclude others from making use of that thing. It has been ar-
gued that equitable property rights possess this characteristic. The most
obvious problem with that argument is that B may have an equitable
property right in relation to an intangible asset. For example, A can hold
a personal right against Z, such as a bank account, on trust for B. In such
a case, there is no independent physical thing against which B has a right.
After all, there is no thing against which A has a right: A merely has a
right to receive payment from Z. If I have title to land or a car I can ex-
clude others from making use of it; it is not meaningful to speak of ex-
cluding another from making use of a debt owed to me.’ Ben Mcfarlane
and Robert Stevens, ‘The Nature of Equitable Property’ (2010) 4 The
Journal of Equity 3.
71 For a critical discussion of the widespread assumption that the ‘right to
exclude’ is central to the ‘formal structure of property’, see James Y
Stern, ‘What is the Right to Exclude and why does it Matter?’ in MH
Otsuka and JE Penner (eds), Property Theory: Legal and Political
Perspectives (CUP 2018).
72 To quote Sarah Worthington’s contribution to the report referred to in
note 77: ‘All intellectual property rights are created by statute, not by the
courts. Notably, despite the “property” terminology, the protection deliv-
ered by these statutory means is not dependent on any idea of there being
“property” in the creative idea or endeavour. Instead, the statute itself
defines rights, and then defines remedies for their infringement, and it is
these statutory rights that are then ‘assets’ that may be assigned or shared
in all the ways that other assets can be dealt with at law.’ The British
Academy, The Royal Society and TechUK.
73 This interpretation is supported by the fact that the report refers to
Oxford v Moss [1978] 68 Cr App 183: in the latter case the Court of
Appeal concluded that confidential information (in this instance an ex-
amination paper) did not fall within the definition of ‘intangible prop-
erty’. Along a similar line, the report could also have referred to the more
recent: Your Response Limited v Data team Business Media Limited [2014]
EWCA Civ 281. In that case, Lord Justice Floyd stated that ‘[a]lthough
information [in this instance, a subscribers database] may give rise to in-
tellectual property rights, such as database right and copyright, the law
has been reluctant to treat information itself as property. When informa-
tion is created and recorded there are sharp distinctions between the in-
formation itself, the physical medium on which the information is
recorded and the rights to which the information gives rise. Whilst the
physical medium and the rights are treated as property, the information
itself has never been’. Notice the distinction between theinformation’
and the rights the latter may give rise to. This distinction is crucial since
the subject matter of a Trust is best defined in terms of rights, not prop-
erty, as explained below (in this section).
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our proposal is concerned. What matters, instead, is the
extent to which regulatory instruments such as the
GDPR confer rights, and for what kind of data. The lat-
ter question—what kind of data gives rise to what kind
of rights—will determine the possible scope of data
Trusts in various jurisdictions.
Quoting Lord Shaw, according to whom ‘[t]he scope
of the trusts recognized in equity is unlimited. There
can be a trust of a chattel or a chose in action, or of a
right or obligation under an ordinary legal contract, just
as much as a trust of land’, McFarlane and Mitchell74
explain in their textbook that:
If the term ‘property’ is not limited to physical things, and
instead extends to any valuable, assignable right, the possi-
bility of the declaration of trust of a non-assignable right
[as per Don King Productions Inc v. Warren75] shows that
the subject matter of a trust need not fall within even that
extended definition of property. For this reason, it has been
suggested that it is more accurate to think of the subject mat-
ter of the trust as a right, rather than as a property. After all,
even in a case where the property held on trust is a physical
thing, such as land, it is the trustees’ right to the land that is
held on trust, and not the land itself.76
Similarly, Robert Chambers seeks to dispel the ‘false
assumptions’ made by many who ‘fear the trust’, and
states that:
Every trust is a relationship between at least two persons (a
trustee and a beneficiary) in which the trustee holds some
right in trust for the beneficiary. Almost any right can be
held in trust [.]77
If the subject matter of a Trust is best thought of as a
right,78 rather than property, the important question
becomes the extent to which the rights conferred by the
GDPR (and other regulatory instruments in other juris-
dictions) can be held in Trust. There are no obvious
public policy reasons why data rights (unlike the right
to vote, for instance) should not be held in Trust, and
data rights are quite different from a right—or license—
to practice dentistry, say, which was deemed unsuitable
given its being intrinsically connected to the right
holder.79 The latter case brings to the fore one impor-
tant point: at the moment the rights to portability, era-
sure, and access as conferred by the GDPR are not
mandatable to a third party. To make such rights man-
datable (in our proposal, to a data trustee) would re-
quire regulatory intervention. This is addressed below.
The extent to which some kinds of data may be said
to give rise to property rights
Today many concur in acknowledging the fact that data
continues to present unique challenges when it comes
to building a battery of rights and responsibilities that
adequately takes into account both its growing impor-
tance as an economic asset and its human rights impli-
cations, given the social vulnerability it entails. While
the GDPR set of rights and responsibilities pertaining to
personal data are rooted in human rights concerns, the
rights to portability, erasure and access mentioned
above can nevertheless be said to provide all that is
needed to give rise to what may plausibly be character-
ized as property rights80 (notwithstanding obstacles spe-
cific to Italy and Germany81). The latter’s strength
varies, and decreases (all the way to nil) as we move
away from data that is ‘directly provided’ by the data
subject (1), to data such as cookies—for which there is
no right to portability—(2), all the way to data that is
the result of sophisticated processing, such as the data
leading to credit rating scores (3).
In his ‘relational taxonomy’ of personal data,82
Malgieri helpfully distinguishes between the above three
levels to argue that the ‘intermediate category’ (2) is the
most complex, calling as it does for ‘“shared property”
based on shared exclusive rights’: ‘Consumers will have
full exclusionary rights against all commercial actors
74 McFarlane and Mitchell also refer to Re Lehman Brothers (International)
Europe, where Briggs J notes that: ‘[N]o-one doubts the beneficial inter-
est of clients in a solicitor’s client account. Yet the subject matter of that
fund consists entirely of the solicitor’s purely personal rights as a cus-
tomer of the client account bank or banks’.
75 Don King Productions Inc v Warren (No1) [2000] Ch 291; [1999] 3 WLR
276, CA (Civ Div).
76 Ben McFarlane and Charles Mitchell, Hayton and Mitchell: Text, Cases
and Materials on the Law of Trusts and Equitable Remedies (Sweet &
Maxwell 2015), our emphasis.
77 Robert Chambers, ‘Distrust: Our Fear of Trusts in the Commercial
World’ (2010) 63 Current Legal Problems 631.
78 As such, the beneficiaries are said to have a ‘right against a right’.
Mcfarlane and Stevens notably highlight the advantages of this analysis
when it comes to the cross-jurisdictional applicability of the Trust law
framework: ‘a key practical consequence of the [right against a right]
analysis is that it provides a model by which institutions such as the trust
or equitable assignment can be accommodated within legal systems that
have not experienced the productive paradox of two rival court systems
[Equity and common law].’ Mcfarlane and Stevens 9.
79 Caratun v Caratun (1992) 96 DLR (4th) 404, 10 OR (3d) 385 (CA).
80 Purtova, Andreas Boerding and others, ‘Data Ownership—A Property
Rights Approach from a European Perspective’ (2018) 11 Journal of Civil
Law Studies 323. In an American context, see also the earlier work of
Schwartz who defends the need for a ‘qualified ‘propertization’ of per-
sonal data: Paul M Schwartz, ‘Property, Privacy, and Personal Data’
(2003) 117 Harvard Law Review 2056.
81 In Germany, s 90 of the BGB specifies that only physical objects can con-
stitute ‘things’ in the legal sense (ie be the object of property rights).
Similarly, art 810, together with art 814, of the Italian Civil Code specifies
that data cannot be a ‘good’ given its intangibility. The latter class of
assets calls for a special law if it is to give rise to property rights.
82 Gianclaudio Malgieri, ‘Property and (Intellectual) Ownership of
Consumers’ Information: A New Taxonomy for Personal Data’ (2016) 4
Privacy in Germany PinG 133.
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interested in their data (including the company which
has a shared ownership on such data); the data control-
lers/businesses will be able to exercise their exclusionary
rights against all competing companies but not against
the data subject (whose interests prevail).’ In the weak-
est category (3), in contrast, the extensive processing
needed to give rise to data such as credit rating scores
entails that the ‘quasi-property of companies prevail on
control rights of individuals’.83 The rights individuals
do have in relation to such ‘weakly relating data’ (3) do
not have any of the characteristics of property rights:
they are best characterized as consumer protection
rights, such as Article 14 GDPR’s right to information
about the controller, processing, purpose, etc.
Challenges and opportunities inherent in holding
data rights under a Trust (rather than a contractual
agreement or corporate structure)
On the challenges front, the varying extent to which
different kinds of data can be deemed to give rise to
different levels of property rights—from full portability,
access and erasure rights all the way to nil (ie ‘mere’ in-
formation rights)—is a problem only if one assumes
that the subject matter of a Trust must be able to be
defined as ‘property’, an assumption which the above
section has sought to dispel.
Other difficulties include the fact that it can be diffi-
cult to ascertain what data relates to which identifiable
person: sometimes data relates to more than one person
at a time (shared provenance issues are discussed in the
section discussing implementation challenges), some-
times the extent to which data is ‘identifiable’ varies
over time, depending on the degree of data
aggregation.84
The weight of the challenges stemming from these
identifiability issues (and the non-rival nature of data)
will in part depend on specific implementation choices,
which are discussed below. For now it is worth empha-
sizing at this stage that a data Trust does not necessarily
have to ‘pull’ the data held by various data collectors.
One can imagine an ecosystem of Trusts where one
Trust A specializes in direct data management (possibly
choosing to locate its servers in a specific jurisdiction),
while Trust B devolves responsibility for data manage-
ment to Trust A. Trust B would then focus on the pol-
icy, rather than the practicalities, underlying data
sharing. This would allow trustees to focus on the use to
which the data is put rather than the detailed mecha-
nisms of access and storage which would be standard-
ized. Alternatively, Trust C may work on the basis of a
wholly decentralized model, whereby the beneficiaries’
data stays wherever it is. Depending on the particular
model adopted, data trustees may or may not be
deemed data controllers under the GDPR.85 Any Trust
may choose to share data with other Trusts that con-
form to their constitutional terms. While some Trusts
may be set up to manage and protect as much of the
data pertaining to their beneficiaries as possible, other
Trusts may specialize in only a particular kind of per-
sonal data, such as health data. Such specialized Trusts
are likely to want to negotiate with the more generalist
Trusts so as to be able to reap the benefits that come
with large-scale datasets.
Most significant among the challenges mentioned so
far is the possibility of mandating the rights to portabil-
ity, access and erasure mentioned earlier. In Europe,
Article 80(1) of the GDPR reads:
The data subject shall have the right to mandate a not-for-
profit body, organisation or association which has been
properly constituted in accordance with the law of a
Member State, has statutory objectives which are in the
public interest, and is active in the field of the protection of
data subjects’ rights and freedoms with regard to the pro-
tection of their personal data to lodge the complaint on his
or her behalf, to exercise the rights referred to in Articles
77, 78 and 79 on his or her behalf, and to exercise the right
to receive compensation referred to in Article 82 on his or
her behalf where provided for by Member State law.
The above wording has given rise to a certain amount of
controversy, since it is debatable whether the ‘where
provided for by Member State law’ applies to the whole
sentence or to the right to receive compensation only.86
For our purposes, what matters is that Article 80(1)
only mentions the rights in Articles 77, 78, and 79 as
83 Ibid.
84 ‘The same piece of data, depending on a particular context, can be per-
sonal and non-personal, more or less likely to relate to an identifiable
natural person, and with a stronger or weaker link to that person. [. . .]
The difficulty lies, first, in determining at which point the level of relation
to an individual is sufficient to establish property rights, and second, in
tracing the presence of such a relation.’ N Purtova, ‘Do Property Rights
in Personal Data make Sense after the Big Data Turn: Individual Control
and Transparency’ (2017) 10 Journal of Law and Economic Regulation
64.
85 It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the scope and nature of
the legal obligations stemming from a data trustee’s potential ‘controller’
status.
86 For a summary of this controversy, see Alexia Pato, ‘The National
Adaptation of Article 80 GDPR: Towards the Effective Private
Enforcement of Collective Data Protection Rights’ in K Cullagh, Olivia
Tambou and S Bourton (eds), National Adaptations of the GDPR
(Collection Open Access Book, Blogdroiteuropeen 2019) n 9. Pato nota-
bly refers to the wording of the Italian version, the historical develop-
ment of art 80 and the contrasted wording of art 80(2) to conclude that
only the possibility to extend the representative action to the right to
compensation is left to the discretion of the member States.
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‘mandatable’. This raises the following question: would
national legislation aimed at making the rights to porta-
bility, erasure and access mandatable (to a data trustee)
be in breach of EU law? A positive answer is unlikely,
since such intervention would not necessarily extend
(nor diminish) the scope of controllers’ obligations.
Given the current, well-documented difficulties in
exercising the rights to access, portability and erasure,
there are pressing, positive reasons for regulatory inter-
vention on this front. It is also worth emphasizing that
this mandatability issue would be just as much a prob-
lem for the contractual or corporate structures envis-
aged in the ‘Legal Framework report’ mentioned
earlier,87 insofar as they also rely on an appointed third
party to exercise the rights to portability, access, and
erasure.
Now, while the above challenges are by no means
negligible, they do not constitute reasons to doubt that
data rights can held under a legal Trust. To conclude
otherwise and ‘make do’ with a contractual or corporate
framework is not only to impose an unjustifiably nar-
row understanding of equitable Trusts and their pur-
ported subject-matter. It is also to deprive society of a
particularly valuable governance tool given the unprece-
dented challenges (and vulnerabilities) at stake. Not
only is a Court’s equitable jurisdiction to supervise and
intervene if necessary not easily replicable within a con-
tractual or corporate framework, the importance of the
fact that ‘[e]quity employs ex post moral standards,
emphasizes good faith and notice, couches its reasoning
in terms of morals, and is sometimes vague rather than
bright line’88 cannot be overestimated.
Case studies
The following ‘case studies’ are meant to illustrate the
complementarity of our data Trusts proposal with the
legal provisions pertaining to different kinds of personal
data. This delineation into kinds is for illustrative pur-
poses only—most data Trusts are likely to encompass
all or at least several of these ‘categories’ of data (which
may overlap).
Medical data
Patient consent to participate in specific medical studies
is currently undertaken on an individual basis, often
confronting patients with a significant decision that
must be taken at a moment of greater vulnerability,
faced with the imminent diagnosis of a potentially seri-
ous disease. This individual consent determines who
may have access to the data shared by the patient, and
for what purpose. Because the terms by reference to
which consent is given vary across different studies, it is
often difficult to pool data obtained in the context of
different studies, even if the patient’s intent was to share
their data more generally with organizations that bring
benefit to the wider public. The GDPR accounts for this
challenge, notably by relaxing the purpose specificity re-
quirement. To take into account the fact that data min-
ing techniques often search for correlations within
disparate datasets, recital 33 suggests that the purpose of
data collection can be defined very widely, merely refer-
ring to a certain area of research.
The emergence of an ecosystem of data Trusts could
go further still in removing current obstacles to research
while at the same time improving data subjects’ ability
to make choices that reflect their aspirations. The need
to choose among different Trusts would indeed encour-
age patients to think about their sharing preferences
before possibly being placed in a vulnerable position.
The necessity to consider the specific requirements of
clinical studies—and different ways of accommodating
those requirements within different approaches to data
governance—would also be more transparent and thus
amenable to much-needed societal debate.
As an example of such requirements, consider the
need for a clinical study’s samples to be randomized:
maintaining the validity of a study’s conclusions indeed
often requires continual access to consented data, at
least over a given time period. Again, the GDPR
addresses this requirement by allowing researchers to
further process personal data for research purposes in
spite of a data subject’s request for erasure, insofar as
this request is ‘likely to render impossible or seriously
impair the achievement of the [research] objectives’
(Article 17(3)(d)). Similarly, a researcher may override
a data subject’s objection to processing if ‘the processing
is necessary for the performance of a task carried out for
reasons of public interest’ (Article 21(6)). As for what
counts as ‘public interest’, it is left open to further speci-
fication: Recital 45 merely specifies that it ‘should have
a basis in Union or Member State law’.
Given its complexity, the legal framework hinted at
in the above paragraphs is unlikely to be grasped by
even the best-informed patients. In contrast, data trust-
ees may meaningfully balance their Trust’s commitment
to providing data for societal benefits—if any—with the
terms governing data sharing. They may achieve such
balance by for instance making sure that access to the
data is restricted to health professionals, with particular
87 Reed, BPE solicitors and Pinsent Masons (see n 1). 88 H Smith, ‘Property, Equity and the Rule of law’ in L Austin and D
Klimchuk (eds), Private Law and the Rule of Law (OUP 2014).
Sylvie Delacroix and Neil D. Lawrence  Bottom-up data trusts 13ARTICLE
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/idpl/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/idpl/ipz014/5579842 by guest on 12 January 2020
safeguards in place. Once a significant number of people
join particular Trusts, the relevant data trustees may
well be in a position to negotiate safeguards that go be-
yond (or substantiate) those currently specified by the
GDPR—Article 89 (1)—for research purposes. At the
moment, the GDPR requires that technical and organi-
zational measures be put in place to ensure that only the
personal data necessary for the research purposes is
processed (in accordance with the data minimization
principle (Article 5(c)). Recital 33 also rather vaguely
states that the processing must be ‘in keeping with rec-
ognized ethical standards for scientific research’. Given
the contested nature of such ethical standards, data
trustees may be brought to play a significant role in the
debate that currently surrounds ‘ethical standards’ when
it comes to data research. They are also more likely to
be in a position to monitor compliance with such safe-
guards, and possibly steer what is considered ‘best prac-
tice’ within particular research studies.
Social media data
As we progressively appreciate the importance of the so-
cial and environmental determinants of health, any en-
deavour to neatly delineate what counts as ‘health data’
versus ‘social media data’ is increasingly futile: social
media interactions can be indicative of both our mental
and physical health. Simultaneously, our interactions on
social media change our perception of the world around
us in ways that we do not directly control. The adverts
we are shown and the structure of our online environ-
ment (including information feeds) are determined by
algorithms that seek to maximize user engagement.
They can be validated through large-scale A/B testing,
monitoring in real time the effect of particular adverts
(or news content) on the level of engagement shown by
users with particular profiles. As users’ attention is
more likely to be grabbed by content that reinforces
their existing preferences, beliefs or fears, the drive to
maximize user engagement not only leads to ‘filter bub-
bles’. It also increases the extent to which users are likely
to indiscriminately accept fake news.89
For an individual to make a particular choice about
how data from their social media feed is shared when
they interact with these sites may require examination
of extensive terms and conditions each time they join a
site. Additionally, if terms and conditions change they
may require re-examination. Since social media plat-
forms often provide valuable tools for communities,
users may feel obliged to accept any changes to data
processing terms and conditions for fear of losing these
benefits.
These power asymmetries would be addressed by
data Trusts. As more people join data Trusts, terms and
conditions negotiations would be handled by each data
Trust. Rather than stipulating whether a user agrees to
particular terms and conditions, users would simply
state which data Trust they belong to. Their data could
then be dealt with accordingly. This negotiating power
is not a structural condition of the proposal: it is merely
a side effect of the power that would accrue to the Trust
through the pooling of data rights.
Genetic data
Genetic data presents particular challenges because our
genome encodes not only information about ourselves
but our relatives too: sensitive information can leak
through other individuals sharing their genomic data.
While capturing historic serial killers90 may be unam-
biguously seen as a good thing for society, other details
can leak through genetic data, such as misallocated par-
enthood. These issues are sensitive and personal. Even
those who argue that a child always deserves to know
the truth about their parentage would readily acknowl-
edge that such information should be revealed sensi-
tively to the individual concerned, not accidentally via
their siblings or distant cousins.
Like all personal data whose provenance is shared,91
genetic data does not lend itself to ‘standard’ access,
portability, and erasure rights. While the inclusion of
‘genetic data’ within the GDPR’s ‘special category’
(Article 9) does acknowledge the sensitivity of the rights
at stake, the delineation of adequate safeguards—given
the research exemption in Article 9(2)(j)—is largely left
to national legislators, prompting some to worry about
their effectiveness.92 Our data Trust proposal is not
meant to ‘solve’ all the issues surrounding data whose
provenance is shared. What it can do is provide a sorely
needed ‘bottom-up’ forum for societal debate, and pos-
sibly point towards new ways of approaching those
problems. Genetic data could, for instance, lend itself to
89 M Mitchell Waldrop, ‘News Feature: The Genuine Problem of Fake
News’ (2017) 114 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
12631.
90 Over the last ten years, familial DNA searching (whereby DNA voluntar-
ily uploaded to a genealogy or family database is relied on to find close
matches for unidentified DNA evidence, in which case users of the gene-
alogy database may unwittingly become ‘genetic informants’) is increas-
ingly being used to solve ‘cold’ cases on both sides of the Atlantic.
91 This shared provenance issue applies in a range of contexts, from ambi-
ent monitoring or surveillance (image and/ or sound) to social media
feeds.
92 Ka¨rt Pormeister, ‘Genetic Data and the Research Exemption: is the
GDPR Going too Far?’ (2017) 7 International Data Privacy Law 137.
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the formation of a specific, emergent form of data
Trust, where there is no longer direct overlap between
beneficiaries and settlors. As a settlor I may indeed ‘en-
trust’ my genomic data for the benefit of my children
(or other relatives). Depending on the terms of this fa-
milial data Trust, a scientific organization may or may
not have access to this data under certain conditions.
Such a ‘familial’ model may also be applicable to other
forms of data where personal provenance is shared (see
note 45), even if the origin is not familial relationships.
Financial data
Accumulated financial data (in combination with other
datasets) is used to make decisions that range from
credit-worthiness to identity verification. In the past,
the credit-worthiness of an individual or company
would have been confirmed by a letter from their bank
manager or an audit of corporate accounts. Today,
banks centralize financial transaction information with
credit bureaux (or in the UK, credit reference agencies),
who then validate an individual’s credit worthiness.
Such validation is normally a prerequisite for obtaining
a loan or credit card. Without this information, lenders
would have to rely on self-declaration of financial status,
which would leave them exposed to dishonesty.
While the use of credit agencies rectifies the informa-
tion asymmetry between individuals and lenders, it cre-
ates a power asymmetry between credit reference
agencies and data subjects. An individual data subject is
required to comply with the stipulations of credit bu-
reaux to receive a loan, but the subject has little to no
representation in steering those stipulations. Regulatory
interventions can only go so far in addressing the chal-
lenges raised by this power asymmetry: in the UK the
credit bureaux are commercial entities regulated by the
Financial Conduct Authority. They have responded to
the GDPR with the Credit Reference Agency
Information Notice, which outlines how each agency
uses and shares personal data, and for what purposes.
Unsurprisingly, erasure rights are severely restricted, as
is the ability to object to further processing: in both
cases, there is a strong likelihood of being overridden by
the agency’s ‘overriding legitimate interest to continue
processing’ (data portability rights do not apply, given
the reliance on ‘legitimate interests’ as the ground of
processing). Given these limitations, do data Trusts
have any role to play here?
We believe they do. Data Trusts could leverage the
right to information (Article 14 GDPR) of their members
to ensure greater transparency in the operation of the
credit reference agencies. This would enable the data
trustees to ensure that care of the data subjects’ personal
data is not compromised by the commercial interests of
the Credit Reference Agencies. Breaches of Data
Protection do occur: Equifax93 Ltd was recently given the
maximum possible fine of £500,000 under the 1998 Data
Protection Act. But this is after the fact law enforcement.
From a more constructive perspective, Data Trusts might
provide a mechanism to ensure that the data subjects’
voices are better heard in the drafting of data sharing
terms, and in ensuring best standards are adhered to.
Loyalty card data
Loyalty programs encourage consumers to continue to
shop at the same outlets by rewarding repeat visits or
purchases. Loyalty programs have evolved to also better
characterize each consumer, thus allowing targeted ad-
vertising. Like social media data, there is great potential
for loyalty card data, particularly from supermarkets, to
be used in the context of personalized health analysis.
Loyalty card data could for instance provide informa-
tion about what individuals or families have been con-
suming in their diet: traditionally, dietary intake
information is gathered by self-reporting. Yet, evidence
suggests that this self-reporting approach is inaccurate,
with biases towards perceived norms.94
Since such potential medical uses are not normally an-
ticipated in the terms and conditions of the Loyalty card
scheme for which individual consent is required, ‘digital
receipts’ have yet to be used extensively in medical stud-
ies. In contrast, a data Trust could stipulate in advance
that loyalty card data should be made available for medi-
cal research, under certain conditions. Thanks to such a
data-portability stipulation, medical studies would be
able to obtain easier access to this potentially fruitful
data from a number of different loyalty card schemes.
Implementation challenges
First, it is worth emphasizing at the outset that our data
Trust proposal would be able to reach across different
93 On 7 September 2017, Equifax, a US-based credit monitoring company,
announced that over 140 million consumers’ personal information had
been stolen from its network. The subsequent ICO investigation found
that Equifax’s UK arm had not taken the necessary steps to ensure that
Equifax Inc—the American parent company which was processing con-
sumers’ data on its behalf—was adequately protecting consumers’ per-
sonal information.
94 Dale A Schoeller, ‘How Accurate is Self-Reported Dietary Energy Intake?’
(1990) 48 Nutrition Reviews 373; BM Appelhans and others, ‘To what
Extent do Food Purchases Reflect Shoppers’ Diet Quality and Nutrient
Intake?’ (2017) 14 The International Journal of Behavioral Nutrition and
Physical Activity 46.
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jurisdictions, despite the Trust’s historical origin: Trust
structures find their roots in the development of the
‘court of equity’ in 14th-century England. The ‘court of
equity’ was born out of the need to provide remedies to
claimants—such as returning crusaders who had trans-
ferred the title to their land while on crusade—when
none were available under the common law: the spirit
underlying our ‘data Trust’ proposal is not dissimilar,
in that the ‘remedies’ currently provided to data sub-
jects can be seen as deficient. Today, Trust structures
can and do operate in non-common-law jurisdictions,95
and there is a growing interest in their cross-
jurisdictional aspects: many social and legal functions of
a Trusteeship are served by analogous ‘offices’ in civil
law,96 if by other names.97
Among the challenges that will have to be critically
considered for our proposal to become a ‘live’ possibil-
ity (and lend momentum to budding initiatives98), two
deserve a special mention: uptake and exit procedures.
To start with uptake: the novel and multifaceted na-
ture of the risks pertaining to personal data is difficult
enough to grasp for the ‘actively interested’ individual
who is computer literate. Many people are not even
aware of the fact that most of the personal data held by
corporations is ‘passively’ obtained through ambient
tracking devices. As a result, the average level of interest
in registering with a data Trust may be low. If data
Trusts are not to end up as a means of increasing the
bargaining power of only the least vulnerable part of the
population (ie those that are already data-aware), a vari-
ety of measures ought to be considered. The latter could
range from ‘simply’ compelling large data controllers to
flag up the existence of a variety of data Trusts and their
underlying benefits, to possibly implementing some ‘de-
fault’ data Trusts—focusing for instance on local data
sharing needs: in the absence of choice, data subjects
would be assigned to such ‘default’, publicly funded
Trusts, with frequent, proactive reminders about the
possibility of joining alternative Trusts. From a justifica-
tory perspective, such a default policy could find its
roots in reasons that are very similar to those that have
led to the default provision of a pension fund (ie a poor
understanding of the long-term risks impairs an ability
to make informed decisions). Yet, the dangers inherent
in such a paternalist approach warrant great caution:
aside from the need to make sure that opt-out proce-
dures remain extremely accessible throughout (and ro-
bustly implemented), one would also need some
ongoing review process. The latter would not only
nudge those who have been assigned to a default Trust
to consider switching, but also review the extent to
which the terms of the default Trust do optimally serve
the needs and aspirations of its beneficiaries.
A related challenge stems from security concerns.
One may worry that data Trusts may inadvertently in-
crease the extent to which the data that is collected
ambiently can be traced back to particular individuals.
Take the rotating MAC address currently used by
iPhones to minimize the extent to which our passive
data trail can be traced back to particular users as an ex-
ample: does the emergence of data Trusts structures
mean that such protective measures would have to be
relinquished?99 Not necessarily: a variety of differential
privacy techniques may be relied on to address such
risks.
Another challenge relates to exit procedures: many of
the ‘smart’ devices and appliances collecting user data
are used in a way that makes it very difficult, if not im-
possible, to find any data that is related to one user
only. In that context, how does one determine what is
owed to a person leaving a particular data Trust? This
question is one that current data controllers are already
familiar with and each Trust may specify different ways
of disentangling data for the purpose of exit procedures.
A related concern bears upon accountability procedures
for data trustees. Their being held to the high standards
entailed by fiduciary duties may not make that much of
a difference if the data Trustee is unable to compensate
for the harm created by lax data management. Should
data Trustees hold liability insurance, and if so who
pays for it? Can the public nature of the services pro-
vided by data trustees (and the vulnerabilities they ad-
dress) be deemed similar enough to those provided by
medical doctors to justify their being publicly funded?
Should data Trusts be overseen by a regulatory body
that would set training requirements and some code of
95 See also note 71 on the cross-jurisdictional applicability advantages of
the ‘right against a right’ analysis referred to in section ‘ Data rights as
the subject matter of the Trust’.
96 There is growing interest in those aspects of Trust Law that can plausibly
be imported into domestic civil law, and in the harmonization potential
that would result from such efforts: Reinout Wibier, ‘Can a Modern
Legal System Do without the Trust?’ in Lionel Smith (ed), The Worlds of
the Trust (CUP 2013) and Ruiqiao Zhang, ‘A Comparative Study of the
Introduction of Trusts into Civil Law and its Ownership of Trust
Property’ (2015) 21 Trusts & Trustees 20; Rau´l Lafuente Sa´nchez,
‘Recognition of Foreign Trusts and Challenges Facing the Spanish
Courts’ (2017) 23 Trusts & Trustees 12.
97 Civil legal systems have traditionally denied the domestic applicability of
Trust Law, given its divergent underpinnings—and its ability to be
deployed to skirt the law.
98 Existing personal data repository initiatives such as ‘Citizen me’, ‘mid-
ata’, etc would benefit from the development of an ecosystem of Trusts.
99 Mavroudis and Veale (n 2).
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conduct for data trustees, together with an expert advi-
sory body tasked with scoping out the long-term prob-
lems and/or side-effects associated with particular types
of data governance?
Conclusion
The legal institution of Trusts was born—almost 700
years ago—out the lacunae of the Common Law: the lat-
ter was for instance unable to provide remedies to those
who had trusted others with the title to their land while
on crusade. The problems which our data Trust proposal
seeks to address do not have much in common with
those of 14th-century crusaders. Indeed, it seeks to re-
verse—rather than perpetuate—a data governance frame-
work that is strikingly similar to a feudal system, whereby
data subjects’ leaked data is exploited by increasingly
large data controllers in a seemingly inexorable way.
Laudable as they are, current regulatory endeavours to
curb contractual freedom cannot by themselves reverse
those power imbalances. Nor can they suffice to address
the slow insidious compromising of our ability to main-
tain a social self that is at least partly controlled by us.
Remedies for the latter ills are unlikely to be found exclu-
sively in further, ‘one-size-fits-all,’ top-down regulation.
Our data Trust proposal aims to empower us, data
subjects to ‘take the reins’ of our data in a way that
acknowledges both our vulnerability and our limited
ability to engage with the day-to-day choices underlying
data governance. The availability of a variety of data
Trusts—each reflecting a particular set of aspirations
(and attitude to risk)—not only promises a degree of
adaptability that top-down regulation is unlikely to
match. It is also conducive to a much greater level of so-
cietal awareness and debate. As a vehicle facilitating the
constructive articulation of data governance aspirations,
an ecosystem of data Trusts addresses needs that are
complementary to those within the reach of regulatory
interventions such as the GDPR (including collective
enforcement aspects). Importantly, by potentially facili-
tating access to ‘pre-authorized’, aggregated data (con-
sent would be negotiated on a collective basis, according
to the terms of each Trust), our data Trust proposal
may remove key obstacles to the realization of the po-
tential underlying large datasets.
To be effective, the Data Trusts we propose need to
be representative of the data subjects concerns. A suc-
cessful data Trust will be one whose constitutional
terms better encapsulates the aspirations of a large part
of the population. That Trust would, in turn, yield
more influence over data controllers. This ascendancy,
combined with the fiduciary responsibility of the data
Trustees, is key to rebalancing power imbalances within
our current system of data governance. Seeding an eco-
system of data Trusts (ideally through a combination of
public and private initiatives), together with the crea-
tion of a body of competent data Trustees, is a key com-
ponent to bringing about such rebalancing.
doi:10.1093/idpl/ipz014
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